Characterising religious emotions

In what follows, I shall deal with three issues concerning religious emotions. First, I shall make some remarks on the difference between characterising and defining emotions. Secondly, I shall pay attention to some theories of emotions in recent philosophy of mind. Thirdly, I shall shortly introduce my view on emotions and particularly religious emotions.


1. The distinction between defining and characterising

To begin with, if you read philosophical books or articles on emotions, you should be careful of the fact that even quite formal and strict way of expressing thoughts, philosophy of mind makes use a rather robust language. It is typical of it to argue that something is so and so but in a certain sense it is neither willing to make definitions nor pretty successful in construing them , however. If an author writes that, for instance, “emotions are judgments” or that “emotions are feelings,” he or she is not necessarily forming a definition of emotions. One is characterising rather, that is, referring to something that is crucial or essential to emotions in one’s opinion. If these kinds of characterisations are taken as definitions, a reader faces problems. Definitions are rather formal expressions demanding subindex df.

It is, of course, a philosophical problem, what it is to define, but let us suppose that it means, metaphorically speaking, to close the discussion. When defined, you have found the truth and revealed the biff of the matter. Characterising is a broader way of philosophical investigation. When characterising you try to say what is typical of something but you are not trying to capture everything.

To some extent, distinguishing between characterising and defining is artificial since usually those writers who characterise are seeking the truth and are willing to find essential things. However, I find the distinction significant and I think that most of writers dealing with emotions are characterising rather than defining them. When writing that emotions are judgments or feelings, they are not trying to say that it is a definition of emotions that they are judgments or feelings. Rather, they are claiming that it is their judgmental nature or affective nature that is interesting, significant and essential to emotions.

2. Theories of emotions in philosophy of mind

Let us shift the focus on those theories. Aristotle thought that emotions involve three common compounds. They involve an evaluation stating that something positive or negative is happening in a relevant way to the subject. The former gives rise to a pleasant or unpleasant feeling that denotes an awareness of one’s or some else’s position. This, for is part, is associated with a behavioural suggestion to act in an appropriate way. Moreover, there are somatic changes associated with emotions. For the Stoic philosophers, in their part, emotions are false judgments. Stoic emotions, distress, pleasure, appetite and fear, consists of two judgments: that something is good or bad and that one should react in a certain way.

In recent discussion some theories seems to be componential Aristotelian theories. Such theories have been but forward, for instance, by William Lyons, Justin Oakley, and Patricia Greenspan. Some other theories resemble Stoic theories even though their attitude to emotions is positive. They don’t regard emotions as false judgments. Such theories has been put forward by Martha Nussbaum and Robert Solomon.

According to William Lyons typical emotions are constituted by several components:
perception
belief
evaluation
desire
behavioural suggestion
physiological changes
feelings (registrations of physiological changes)

When writing about emotions different writers give quite a similar description of them involving compound enumerated by Lyons but they characterise emotions differently. In classical theories, Descartes argues that emotions are feelings, that is, passive perceptions of the mind, but in fact, his description of emotions involves compounds listed by Lyons. The same is true of William James’ theory. He says that emotions are feelings. But, they are feelings caused by some ‘exciting fact´. Even though Stoic philosophers said that emotions are judgments that resemble the evaluation in Lyon’s list, they were quite interested in affective nature of emotions, however.

For this reason I have tried to argue that it makes sense to characterise emotions as feelings and judgments, the later term taken very broadly. In my view emotions involve affective component and cognitive component and we can identify a mental phenomenon as an emotion by these terms, terms of affective and cognitive aspects. I call the generic condition of emotions the idea that emotions involve an affective-feeling component and an evaluative cognitive component.

For instance, if a person fears a dog, there is

(1) an external object, a dog
(2) the perception of it
(3) the internal object (intentional object), thought of dog
(4) the self-regarding evaluation of a dog (that the dog is harmful for him or her)
(5) affective changes
(6) feeling (a pleasant of unpleasant state of consciousness) of those changes in relation to cognitive setting
(7) naming of an emotion: fear

3. Three conditions of religious emotions


Let us proceed to deal with religious emotions. In his famous passage of the City of God Augustine writes: “They fear eternal punishment and desire eternal life.” The idea of mixed feelings traced back to Plato’s Philebus was widely accepted as a Christian model of affections in Ancient theology. Besides Augustine, it was made use by Gregory the Great who former his theology of spirituality in terms of two compunctions, namely the compunction of love and the compunction of fear. In modern theology, the tradition was followed by Rudolf Otto by his notions of God as mysterium tremendum et fascinans. It may have some interest to note that the tradition of mixed feeling has remained alive thoughout the history. What are religious emotions about?

In the history of Christian theology, one faces a line of thinking according to which believers feel emotions that are radically different from those felt by non-believers. I shall not deal with this strong tradition here, however. In what follows I shall pay my attention to the view that religious emotions are natural emotions, that is, their structure is similar to that of emotions in general. They involve evaluations, feelings, and bodily changes. In other words, religious emotions fulfil the generic condition of emotions as involving both affective-feeling component and the cognitive component. In addition, I argue that they involve three specific conditions that are

(1) the cognitive object condition
(2) the depth condition
(3) the pragmatic condition

According to the cognitive object condition, religious emotions involve a thought of the divine as their essential part. The depth condition is that the thought of the divine is existentially significant to a subject. The pragmatic condition is that the thought of the divine is associated with religious cults and practises such as worship, praying, or meditation.

The notion of the cognitive object condition according to which religious emotions are associated with the notion of divine, can be criticised in different ways. First, one could remark that all religions do not have a concept of God. Secondly, a person may feel an emotion which is not a religious emotion but which is associated with the concept of God. For instance, a tourist in a foreign temple may say “nice gods here”. In my opinion, in characterising religious emotions the point of departure should lie upon the standard cases rather that exceptions. Religions not involving the concept of God are exceptional. From Cicero’s time religion has been characterised as a tie or relation between human being and God or gods. Moreover, I find atheistic interpretation of religion as philosophies and world-views rather than attitudes adopted by religious people and institutions. I think, that the notion of divine is quite an open term and it is not necessarily associated with an attitude of assent. For instance, a person may have an attitude “Listen to me, if there is anybody out there”. Correspondingly, a person wandering at a nice landscape may suddenly remember a sentence ‘by tranquil streams he leads me’ and feel religiously without forming a belief that there is a Creator.

How about an emotion that involves the notion of God but is not religious? A person may feel good when admiring religious symbols, for instant. If his or her emotion is religious, I think, it has to be existentially significant for him or her. For this reason I have formed the depth condition. In my mind, in order to be deemed religious, emotions have to be self-regarding, they are associated with one’s commitments and personality.